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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity — Commitment to state hospital — Procedure for release. (1)
When a jury renders a verdict or a court enters a finding of "not guilty b> reason
of meftfcrf illness" purauant to section 76 2 305 insanity", the court shall proceed
then conduct a hearing within five days to determine whether ]f the defendant bas
recovered from bis meirtftl illness is presently mentally ill The defense counsel and
prosecutors ma^ reguest further evaluations and may present testimony from those
examiners. ti-f after wearing, ttre ueienutim » m m mmm xo TTC niuiwnj m, mc
eourt shall order )»m eommittcd to tbe Utah state hospital ^Fbe defendant sbaH
not be released from confinement therein until the eot*rt which eommittcd the
defendant shall, after hearing, ftnd tfcat the defendant fras recovered from hte mentai iHrtess- Notke sfcaH be given to the prosecuting attorney of the hearing
(2) After the hearing and upon consideration of the record, jf _the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still mentally ill and because
of that mental illness presents a substantial danger to himself or others, the court
shall order him committed to the Utah state hospital The defendant shall not be
released from confinement therein until the court which comitted the defendant
shall, after hearing, find that the defendant has recovered from his mental illness
JNotice shall be given to the prosecuting attorney of the hearing For purposes of
this section, a person affected with a mental illness which is iri remission as a
result of medication or hospitalization shall remain committed to the Utah state
hospital if it can be determined within reasonable medical probability that without
continued medication or hospitalization the defendant's mental illness \ull reoccur,
thereby making the person a substantial danger to himself or others
(8) (3) A defendant committed to the Utah state hospital pursuant to subsection
W 121 m a y aPPty» n(>t sooner than six months from the date of the commitment,
to the district court of the county from which he was committed, for an order of
release on the grounds that he has recovered from his mental illness At an} time
that the defendant has recovered from his mental illness, the clinical director of
the state hospital shall certify that fact to the court The court shall conduct a
hearing within ten working days of the receipt of the clinical director's report If
the finding is adverse to the defendant, he shall not be permitted another hearing
more often than once each year, unless the court otherwise orders In such hearings, the burden of proof is on the applicant.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the District Court properly refused to

release defendant from the Utah State Hospital based on medical
opinions that defendant suffered from no mental illness other
than mild mental retardation but that he should not be released
because it would be dangerous to defendant and others.
2.

Whether the District Court properly denied

defendant's request for conditional release where such release is
provided under civil commitment statutes but not under the
criminal commitment of insanity acquittees statutes.

-iv-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 19824

BERNT MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
The State incorporates the Statement of the Case made
in its previous brief in this case with the following additional
information:
On February 5, 1985 defense counsel requested an annual
report from the Utah State Hospital on defendant's current mental
condition in preparation for defendant's annual court review
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1983) (See
Appellant's Brief, Addendum A). Doctors Austin, Howell and
Groesbeck responded with a letter to Judge David B. Dee of the
Third Judicial District Court (See Appendix A and R. 827A).

The

doctors wrote that defendant no longer displayed symptoms of a
mental illness other than mild mental retardation.

They did notf

however, recommend defendant's release from the State Hospital
because "he lacks the social skills and controls necessary to
function anywhere but in a highly-structured in-patient setting
and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of
life or his own welfare" (Appendix Af R. 827A).

On April 30, 1985, Judge Dee heard testimony from the
three doctors concerning defendant's mental condition pursuant to
defendant's petition for release under § 77-14-5(3).

The doctors

again recommended against defendant's release but reiterated that
he had recovered from any mental illness he may have suffered
other than mental retardation.

Based on the doctor's testimonyf

Judge Dee denied defendant's request for release (R. 863).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from Judge Dee's
April 30, 1985 decision.

On May 8f 1985 defendant and the State

stipulated to consolidation of the appeal from the 1985 hearing
with the appeal from the 1984 hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State incorporates the Statement of Facts
previously submitted in its original brief with the following
additional facts:
In April 1985, Dr. Van 0. Austin testified that
defendant had mild mental retardation and an adult adjustment
disorder in January of 1984 (R. 829). Dr. Austin added that
defendant's medical history included diagnosis of psychosis but
that he did not see a firm basis for that diagnosis (R. 830).
The primary past diagnosesf according to Dr. Austin, were mild
mental retardation and various personality disorders (R. 830).
Dr. Austin felt defendant had become more responsible and more
functional than he was in January of 1984 but that he continued
to display angry outbursts not approaching the level or frequency
of the past (R. 831). Dr. Austin opined that defendant had
recovered from any mental illness he may have suffered in the
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past, if in fact he suffered a mental illness (R. 832).
Defendant displays antisocial featuresf mainly conflict of
authorityf but these are not severe enough to support a diagnosis
of a personality disorder (R. 833).
Dr. Austin did not in April of 1985 recommend
defendants release because he felt that defendant may be
dangerous to himself because he lacked the skills to function in
society and that he may be dangerous to others because of poor
judgment and sexual maturity (R. 833-34).

The danger defendant

poses, howeverf Dr. Austin felt was not the result of a mental
illness (R. 833f 834). Dr. Austin does not consider mental
retardation to be a mental illness even though it is listed as
such in the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) (R. 835836).
In January 1984, Dr. Austin testified that defendant
was mildly retarded and suffered from an adjustment disorder and
an underlying thought disorder which he could not specifically
classify (R. 401-402, 407). However, Dr. Austin also referred to
the thought disorder in 1984 as:
An underlying psychotic disorder, a thought
process disorder, which I cannot and have not
been able to over the years classify
specifically as a schizophrenia or as a
depressive psychotic reaction or paranoid
reaction or whatever . . . I have seen
evidence as recently as May of '83 of what I
feel are inappropriate thought processes,
delusions or whatever. And I further base
the belief that there's an underlying
psychotic disorder to the fact he seemed to
function so well while on a fairly large,
high dose of Navane, 35 mg a day, and has
deteriorated rapidly since off the medication
and functioned so poorly since off the
medication . . .

-3-

In April 1985 Dr. Robert Howell testified that he had
found defendant to be mildly retarded and to have an adult
adjustment disorder but nothing more in January of 1984 (R. 842).
Dr. Howell felt that defendants mental condition had improved
since January of 1984 because his environment was more structured
(R. 842). Defendant remains mildly retarded and displays
aggressiveness and dependency (R. 844) but Dr. Austin would not
label these traits as a personality disorder (R. 844-845).

Dr.

Austin agreed that defendant should not be released because he
cannot adjust to society (R. 845-846).

There has been a great

deal of confusion over the years as to what if any mental illness
defendant suffered and Dr. Howell stated that he believed
defendant should not have presented an insanity defense in the
first place (R. 846). Dr. Howell did not mention that belief
before 1985 because he was concerned about defendant's
"instability in the hospitalf which we called an adjustment
disorder, that in good conscience I couldn't [mention it] last
year" (R. 847).
In January of 1984, however Dr. Howell testified that
defendant's impulsivenessf poor judgment in interpersonal
relationships and bending of reality to fit his own inner needs
indicate "that we're dealing with a psychotic process that is very
likely schizophrenia" (R. 483f 485). Dr. Howell noted that
defendant functioned much better in the testing that occurred in
1972 than he did at the time of the hearing in January of 1984 (R.
485).

Dr. Howell opined that defendant would never recover from

the mental illness known as retardation and that absent
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The District Court, in weighing all of the

evidence; including medical opinions, the crime of which defendant
was acquitted and the protection of defendant and society;
properly denied defendant's request for release.

Although the

doctors1 credibility on the question of defendant's recovery may
be questionable, all agree that defendant should remain
hospitalized.

Even if defendant no longer suffers from a mental

illness aside from retardation, or never did, he properly remains
in custody as a retarded person who was acquitted of a violent
crime after pleading the insanity defense and who remains
dangerous to himself and others.
POINT II.

The District Court properly refused to order

the State to provide conditional release programs to defendant
because such programs are not available under Utah's statutory
scheme to criminal insanity acquittees.

Moreover, mandamus cannot

lie where there is no clear statutory duty which the State has
refused to perform.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO RELEASE
DEFENDANT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE HEARING.
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at the
April 1985 hearing revealed that he suffers from nothing other
than mental retardation.

He further alleges, with some support

from the hearing testimony, that he never suffered from any mental
illness other than retardation that was sufficient grounds for his
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defendant remains a danger to himself and others.

Based on this

evidence, Judge Dee properly denied defendants request for
release.
Defendant urges this Court to overturn Jacob and hold
that dangerousness is not a proper criterion for denying release
under § 77-14-5(3) because it is not specifically mentioned in
that subsection of the statute.

Dangerousness is, however, a

criterion for commitment under subsection (2) of § 77-14-5. It
seems inconsistent to say that dangerousness is grounds for
commitment but that a court considering release of a criminally
committed individual may not consider whether he remains
dangerous.

The words "recovered from his mental illness" would be

meaningless unless they are related to the grounds for commitment,
i.e. dangerousness.

c.f. Newton v. Brooks. 426 P.2d 446 (Ore.

1967) (term "until he becomes sane" meaningless unless related to
dangerousness which is reason for commitment).
Defendant asserts also that the evidence adduced at the
April 1985 hearing reveals that he is merely mentally retarded and
that this alone is an insufficient basis for his continued
confinement.

The testimony of the three doctors, however, is not

binding on the court.

The determination of continuing

dangerousness or recovery from mental illness should be a legal
rather than a purely medical decision in which the court weighs
all of the evidence, including medical opinions, the nature of the
crime involved and protection of the public and reaches an
independent judgment.

Application of Noel. 601 P.2d 1152 (Kan.

1979) .

-8-

Furthermore, the doctors' testimony is not entirely
credible on the issue of defendant's recovery or previous
suffering from mental illness because two of the doctors appear to
be espousing opinions on defendant's mental condition which are
inconsistent with their own previous opinions.

Doctors Austin and

Howell both testified in January 1984 that defendant suffered from
some form of psychosis.

Yet, in April 1985, both testified that

defendant may never have suffered from a mental illness other than
mental retardation.

Both Austin and Howell seemed to believe that

retardation is not a mental illness although the DSM-III lists it
as a mental illness and the Utah Code includes it as a mental
disease or defect.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1978).

All three doctors appear to be playing both ends
against the middle in claiming that defendant has recovered from
his mental illness, if he ever suffered from one, but that he
remains dangerous to himself and others.

The hospital staff is

now in a position to protect itself from attack on all fronts
regardless of whether defendant is released.

To the State, they

may say, "We told the courts defendant should not be released, it
is not our fault."

Yet they may also say to the defendant, "We

told the courts you were not mentally ill, it is not our fault."
c.f. Application of Noel, 601 P.2d at 1168.

Such an approach puts

the court in a difficult position which the court should resolve
in favor of public safety.
(Mont. 1971).

See State v. Taylor. 491 P.2d 877, 881

Judge Dee properly determined that the weight of

the evidence in favor of releasing defendant did not outweigh the
public's special interest in his continuing confinement.

-9-

Id.

Other courts have noted that dangerousness as a
standard for release provides a safety valve by which confinement
of a criminal acquittee may be continued where the evidence
offered by the defendant is that he has recovered from his mental
illness.

See, e.g. State v. Taylor, 491 P.2d at 879; Newton v,

BrooksP 426 P.2d at 449.

These courts refer to the comments

accompanying the legislation establishing dangerousness as a
criterion for release.

These comments point out that a criminally

committed person who may be greatly improved may remain dangerous
because of factors in his personality and background other than
mental disease,

id.

The dangerousness standard also provides the

means for controlling the occasional dangerous defendant who
successfully feigned mental illness to gain acquittal.

2d.

Defendant argues also that mental retardation is not a
mental illness and thatr based on retardation alone, there is no
basis for his continued custody nor was there ever a basis for his
confinement at the State Hospital.

On the contrary, however,

defendant was properly committed to the State Hospital in 1972 and
properly remains in custody there.

In 1972, at the time of

defendant's trial, and in 1957, the time of the crime, persons who
were found not guilty by reason of insanity were subject to
commitment to the Utah State Hospital, just as they are today (See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-15 (1953, repealed 1980).

After all,

defendant plead and was found not guilty by reason of insanity in
1972.

Defendant should not be allowed to use the insanity defense

to gain acquittal of a serious, violent crime and then step back
years later saying that he should not have been successful in such
a defense because his mental defect did not qualify.
-10-

Furthermore/ persons of unsound minds were excused from
criminal responsibility for intentional crimes and insane persons
as well as retarded persons were considered to be of unsound mind
in 1957 and 1972.
1973).

(See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-21 (1953f repealed

Most importantlyr the Rules of Construction of the 1953

Code define the words "insane person" as including "idiots,
lunatics, distracted persons and persons of unsound mind" (See
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(16) (1953).

The Rules of Construction

apply "unless such construction would be inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of
the statute."

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (1953).

Thus, it appears

that defendant did, in factf qualify for the insanity defense even
if he was merely mentally retarded at the time of the crime.
Because retarded persons were excused from criminal
responsibility for intentional crimes along with insane persons,
it is reasonable that the Legislature intended to include
retardation as a grounds for a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity.

Thusf in 1972f defendant properly plead and was found

not guilty by reason of insanity even if he was, as he claims,
only mentally retarded and not suffering from any other mental
illness.

Moreover, defendants claim that inclusion of mental

retardation as a mental illness under current release standards
would be ex post facto as applied to him fails on this basis.
Defendant further complains that he has been confined
for a period which he believes is longer than the prison term he
would have served had he been found guilty of raping a five-yearold child.

The sentence for rape of a child under 13 years of age

-11-

in 1957 and in 1972 was not less than 20 years and which may be
for life.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-18 (1953, repealed 1973).

While

there is the possibility that a person convicted of raping a child
would have been paroled earlier, it is not certain that such an
individual would not remain confined for life.

Even if defendant

might have been released from a prison sentence before now, the
potential sentence for a crime is irrelevant to the length and
purpose of the commitment of an insanity acquittee.
£ta±J£f 681 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1984).

Stoneberg v.

The purpose of commitment of an

insanity acquittee is treatment of the illness and to protect the
acquittee and society from potential dangerousness.
United States,
(1983).

U.S.

Jones v.

, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694

For these reasons, an insanity acquittee may be confined

until he is no longer insane or dangerous.

Id.

The evidence adduced at the 1985 hearing lends no
further support to defendant's claim of recovery than did the
evidence adduced at the 1984 hearing.

It is unfortunate for

defendant, yet true that all of the medical experts remain
conviced that defendant should not be released because he is
dangerous to himself and/or others.

That defendant continues to

receive medication, although milder medication, is evidence, of
this reality.

Based on this evidence, Judge Dee could not

properly have ordered defendant's release on the grounds that he
had recovered from his mental illness. While Judge Dee's language
is not entirely clear in outlining what standard the court applied
in denying defendant's release, it appears that the standard was
dangerousness to himself and/or others from the context of the
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ruling as a whole.

For these reasons, the District Court's ruling

should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

As argued in Point IV of the State's original brief,
Judge Dee properly denied defendant's request for a writ of
mandamus in 1984 and, as argued below, again properly denied the
same request in 1985.

This is true for several reasons, the first

and foremost of which is that a criminally committed individual is
not entitled to conditional release.

State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d

865, 869, 870 (Utah 1983); State v. Lindquist. 674 P.2d 1234,
1238, n. 22 (Utah 1983).

The programs which defendant requests

providing for extensive supervision, training and housing
accommodations are, in essence, a conditional release.

It is also

questionable, considering the defendant's need for security
measures, whether conditional release would even result in a less
restrctive alternative for defendant.

As indicated by Doctors

Austin, Howell and Groesbeck, defendant requires a setting equal
in security and structure to the State Hospital.

It is

questionable whether such a structure could be provided outside of
the Hospital.

Even if it could, it appears that the State would

be in the position of providing a facility, for defendant alone,
which duplicated the facilities already available at the State
Hospital.
Finally, mandamus does not lie in this case because
there is no clear statutory duty to provide the services to an
insanity acquittee which are requested by defendant.
-13-

Defendant

must show that a clear statutory duty exists which the State has
refused to perform before the relief requested can be granted.
Garcia Vt Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409r 411, 510 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1973);
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 323, 392 P.2d
622, 623 (1964) • The statutes cited by defendant which he claims
require the State to provide such services do not apply to
criminal insanity acquittees but merely to civil committees or to
persons not committable but who require limited services.

E.g.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 55-19-1 through 55-19-9 (Supp. 1983) and § 64-730 (Supp. 1983).
categories.

Defendant fits into neither of the latter

Judge Dee, therefore, could not properly have applied

those statutes to defendant.
CONCLUSION
The State requests this Court to affirm the decisions
of the District Court in 1984 and 1985 denying defendant's request
for release under § 77-14-5(3).

Should this Court reverse the

District Court1s ruling, the State requests that defendant's
release be stayed for a definite, limited period of time to
provide the State an opportunity to institute civil commitment
proceedings or to implement the programs required for defendant's
care outside of the State Hospital.

The State requests,

therefore, that this case, in the event of a reversal, be remanded
to the District Court for a hearing to determine the length of
time necessary to implement such programs.

Should this Court

determine the District Court did not clearly articulate and relate
the denial of release to the dangerousness criterion, the State
requests a remand for written findings clarifying the ruling.
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UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
100 Years 0t Service
February 26, 1985

The Honorable David B. Dee
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
.Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
re:

MURPHY, Bernt

Case Number:

15606

Dear Judge Dee:
The following is a yearly treatment progess report on Bernt Murphy:
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has displayed some improvement.
During the past year we have seen no indicationss of the signs and symptoms
which have characterized our previous diagnosis of mental illness. However,
he is still, and will remain, mildly mentally retarded. He continues to
display emotional and behavioral lability and impulsivity, unrealistic
expectations of his skills and abilities, poor social skills, and inappropriate sexual impulses and controls* Although these are not healthy
features, they do not approach the threshold necessary to diagnose a
mental illness.
During the past year the treating staff has given him the opportunity
to participate in industrial assignments. His supervisors report that
he has been a very good and reliable worker. In addition, since December
he has been allowed to go on "home visits'* to his aunts' house in West
Jordan and has functioned without incident. However, his participation in
the industrial assignment and his last home visit were both curtailed as the
result of recent apparently unprovoked violent threats to another patient
and staff members.
If the court*continues his present commitment, the treatment staff plans to
continue counseling, encourage participation in industrial assignments,
Structured participation in a sheltered workshop, more frequent home visits,
and counseling to ensure that the home visits are both appropriate and
and productive.
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We are not recommending Bernt*s release since we feel that releasing
him from the state hospital would be doing a disservice to Bernt and
the community. We feel that he lacks the social skills and controls
necessary to function anywhere but in a highly-structured inpatient
retting and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of
life or his own welfare. We feel that however well-intentioned, his
release from the state hospital would rapidly become a social and
individual disaster.
However, we are prepared to certify to the court that Mr. Murphy does
not currently have a mental disease. He does continue to have mild
mental retardation.
Sincerely,

VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist

ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

C. JESS GROESBECK, M.D.
Clinical Director
VOA:lc
cc:

Creighton Horton, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Brooke Wells, Esq., Defense Attorney
Byron Stark, Salt Lake County Clerk's Office

